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1 
The Reputational Basis of Public Accountability 
Madalina Busuioc and Martin Lodge 
 
This paper proposes a reputation-based approach to account for two core puzzles of 
accountability. The first is the misfit between behavioural predictions of the 
hegemonic political science framework for talking about accountability, namely 
principal-agent, and empirical findings. The second puzzle is the unrivalled 
popularity of accountability, given evidence that supposedly accountability-
enhancing measures often lead to opposite effects. A ‘reputation-informed’ 
theoretical approach to public accountability suggests that accountability is not 
about reducing informational asymmetries, containing ‘drift’, or ensuring that 
agents stay committed to the terms of their mandate. Accountability – in terms of 
both holding and giving – is about managing and cultivating one’s reputation vis-à-
vis different audiences. It is about being seen as a reputable actor in the eyes of one’s 
audience(s), conveying the impression of competently performing one’s 
(accountability) roles, thereby generating reputational benefits. 
 
Accountability studies usually start with the assumption that ‘holding to account’ is 
a good thing. After all, it is hardly controversial to suggest that those that are 
granted discretionary power should report on their conduct. Such a starting 
position, however, raises two puzzles.  
One puzzle is the misfit between the hegemonic political science framework for 
talking about accountability, namely principal-agent based accounts, and empirical 
findings (see Schillemans 2013; Busuioc 2013; Olsen 2013; Schillemans and Busuioc 
2015). For the principal-agent based literature, accountability is about ‘holding to 
account’ in order to reduce information asymmetries, thereby containing 
‘bureaucratic drift’ (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987; 1989; Hammond and Knott 
1996). It is about ensuring that those office-holders vested with discretionary powers 
are kept on a ‘leash’ whether in terms of administrative controls (‘deck-stacking’), 
dealing with attentive watchdogs (‘police-patrols’), or granting affected 
constituencies information and other rights so that they can operate some ‘fire-
alarm’.  
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This theoretically informed perspective is challenged by empirical studies that 
highlight the pro-active way in which some actors engage in accountability-related 
activities. Regulatory agencies are found to provide information or engage in 
account-giving processes that go beyond their mandatory requirements; politicians 
appear keen to ‘give account’ of their actions in order to appear legitimate to the 
wider public. Dominant theoretical accounts are further challenged by studies 
locating the source of accountability ‘deficits’ with account-holding principals and 
forums, and not, as expected, with account-giving bureaucratic agents (Schillemans 
and Busuioc 2015; Busuioc 2013; Brandsma 2013). While it is assumed that they are 
interested in accountability processes, those supposed to be holding others to 
account are reported to lack interest in accountability processes and to be less than 
diligent in enacting their duties. 
The second puzzle is that accountability has become ‘a Good Thing, of which it 
seems we cannot have enough’ (Pollitt 2003, 89).  However, as studies of 
performance management have shown, incident data is eliminated or delayed, 
hospital statistics are massaged, resources are re-allocated to hit a target but miss the 
point, and spin-doctors are deployed in order to appear appropriate and compliant. 
Being held to account is also said to have an impact on professional values, 
potentially turning ‘honest triers’ into ‘reactive gamers’ (Bevan and Hood 2006; see 
more generally, Behn 2003; Hood 2006; Heinrich and Marschke 2010; March and 
Sutton 1997; Hood and Dixon 2010). Furthermore, external demands become 
internalised and create strain (Messner 2009). Others have similarly noted how 
depleted intrinsic motivation, due to increased controls and a corresponding 
reduction in policy autonomy, can lead to self-selection as a member of the 
bureaucracy of ‘policy slackers’ rather than ‘zealots’ (Gailmard and Patty 2007). 
Therefore, the second puzzle is the unrivalled popularity of accountability, given an 
empirical track record that documents how supposedly accountability-enhancing 
measures lead to gaming, cheating and slacking and a decline in moral responsibility 
and/or intrinsic motivation. 
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These two puzzles reveal a contrast: one world sees accountability as essential, 
because it has a rather negative view of political and bureaucratic life. 
Accountability is there to reduce the possibilities of ‘shirking’ and ‘drifting’. The 
other world, often without using the word accountability, has a benevolent view of 
political and bureaucratic life, but suggests that accountability-related measures 
have their own distorting effects. In sum, those believing that accountability is a 
‘good thing’ are therefore faced with the following problem: those supposedly 
holding to account are not particularly interested in this task, while those supposed 
to give account do so through distorted information, and/or with motivation-
depleting results. 
This paper argues that a reputation-based approach can resolve these puzzles. 
Reputation holds the key towards accounting for selective attention and variations 
in degrees of interest, intensity and investment in accountability processes (be it 
enthusiastic account-giving, gaming, or non-interested account-holding). By offering 
an alternative predictive account to principal–agent informed approaches to 
accountability, this paper therefore responds to calls about the need for competing 
theoretical approaches to accountability, given the shortcomings of the dominant 
principal-agent-informed paradigm (Olsen 2013; see also Skelcher 2010). The way 
actors present themselves (as individuals and as organisations) to, and are perceived 
and assessed by, a wider set of audiences matters. Accountability is thus not about 
reducing information asymmetries, moral duties, containing agency losses, or 
ensuring that agents stay committed to the original terms of their mandate. Instead, 
accountability – in terms of both holding and giving – is about sustaining one’s own 
reputation vis-à-vis different audiences.  
Thus, whereas principal-agent accounts emphasise the role of formal incentives for 
ensuring post-delegation compliance, a reputational perspective suggests that 
formal structures are much less deterministic of accountability practices and 
outcomes. This does not exclude the possibility that the design of accountability 
mechanisms may initially have had something to do with ideas about how to hold 
those with discretionary power to account. However, actual practice is about 
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advancing one’s standing in the eyes of one’s audience(s) and about being seen as a 
reputable actor, i.e. conveying the impression of performing competently one’s 
(accountability) roles (Goffman 1959, 243), thereby generating reputational benefits.  
The next section explores the implications of a reputation-based perspective for 
accountability. We then move to a discussion of accountability-givers and 
accountability-holders or ‘accountability forums’ (i.e. bodies tasked with holding to 
account). An accountability forum can be synonymous with the principal (the 
original delegator of power) from the principal-agent model, but not necessarily so 
(Bovens 2007). Some forums, such as auditors, the media, or complaint-handlers, 
were not involved in the original delegation of powers. They are not principals in 
the original sense, but third-parties with an oversight mandate. We reflect on the 
implications of this approach with respect to both types of account-holders: third-
party forums and principal-forums. The accountability literature talks about ‘actors’ 
rather than ‘agents’, among other things in order to indicate a broader span of 
relations than the contractual relationship of principal-agent. We use the term 
‘actor’. 
Reputation and accountability: Niche monopolies, audiences and 
interdependencies 
Much has been said about accountability as an end – although what the end actually 
entails might be disputed, depending on one’s choice of perspective. 
Simultaneously, accountability has been seen as a means to achieve particular 
conceptions of government or public service (Lodge and Stirton 2010; Hood 2010; 
Mashaw 2006). Bovens (2007; 2010), for example, distinguishes between democratic, 
constitutional and cybernetic perspectives to evaluate accountability practices and 
their effects. Such normative lenses are generally grounded in state-oriented models 
and norms of governance (Bovens, Schillemans, ‘t Hart 2008).  
By contrast, our approach is ‘organisation-centric’ and predictive in nature. By 
identifying reputation as a key variable in driving accountability behaviour, we seek 
to offer predictive claims to parallel those made by principal-agent based accounts, 
5 
the prime predictive framework informing accountability studies (see Schillemans 
2013 for a meta-study).  
This reputation-based approach does not seek to add a further dimension to existing 
frameworks for evaluating accountability-related provisions and practices. It also 
does not seek to promote one particular doctrinal view regarding the aim of 
accountability. If one wanted however, to suggest an evaluative dimension, then this 
perspective would intimate that the rationale behind accountability provisions is not 
the serving of high-ranking normative goals (democratic control, prevention of 
concentration of powers), but rather more 'mundane' organisational concerns with 
reputation, esteem and, ultimately, survival. From this perspective, enhanced 
control, constitutional checks-and-balances or reflexivity only emerge as by-products 
as opposed to primary goals. For actors seeking to maintain (or enhance) their 
reputation by meeting expectations, being held to account may turn into a primary 
objective. In other words, while accountability objectives do not arise independently 
of reputational concerns, giving account of oneself, according to set criteria, serves as 
a way of justifying one’s existence and can therefore become central to an 
organisation’s and an individual’s sense of identity.  
Reputation-based accounts have witnessed a recent uptake in popularity, largely 
following on the coattails of Dan Carpenter’s Reputation and Power (2010). More 
generally, by building on the work by Goffmann (1959), the importance of 
maintaining an appearance regardless of formal legal provisions has been 
highlighted. Reputation-based accounts have been used to explain varieties in 
enforcement practices (Hawkins 1984), organisational responses to external 
audiences and reputational threats (Maor 2007; Maor 2011; Maor, Gilad, and Ben-
Nun Bloom 2013; Gilad, Maor, and Ben-Nun Bloom 2013; Maor and Sulitzeanu-
Kenan 2015), organisational task prioritisation (Gilad 2015) and decision-making 
time (Maor and Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2013), jurisdictional claim-making (Maor 2010), or 
how reputation and blame-avoidance might deteriorate network performance 
(Moynihan 2012). In addition, reputation-based accounts have been used to explore 
regulatory interactions ranging from enforcement (Gilad and Yogev 2012; Etienne 
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2015) to divergences in co-operation practices among turf-conscious bureaucratic 
actors (Busuioc 2015). 
Following Goffman, reputation management is about the management of day-to-day 
appearances in front of diverse audiences. Appearing to be successful in a successful 
way (i.e. persuasively suggesting that one is more than fulfilling one’s role 
expectations) establishes a good reputation. A strong reputation for competence is a 
‘valuable political asset’ (Carpenter 2002, 491). It is the source of bureaucratic power, 
allowing agencies to foster their autonomy, build alliances, enlist political support 
and ultimately, help to ensure their survival (Carpenter 2002, 2010; Maor 2015). Such 
a reputation involves ‘a set of beliefs about the unique and separable capacities, roles 
and obligations of [an agency], where these beliefs are embedded in audience 
networks’ (Carpenter 2010, 45). Such a definition has three implications for the 
development of a reputational account of public accountability.  
One implication is that accountability-holding and –giving is about maintaining, if 
not enhancing other’s beliefs about ‘unique capacities, roles and obligations’. In line 
with James Q. Wilson’s notion of jurisdictional turf, reputation management is not 
about empire-building in terms of budgetary size or jurisdictional scope (Wilson 
1989). Instead, organisations and individuals will focus on their ‘core tasks’ that they 
feel comfortable in controlling and that help them differentiate themselves from 
other organisations, cultivating so–called ‘reputational uniqueness’ (Carpenter 2001). 
In other words, they will seek to avoid interdependence in order to differentiate 
themselves – but also not to be accountable for others’ performances—and they will 
reduce their exposure to tasks that are likely to cause them grief. Organisations 
therefore seek to occupy popular niche monopolies rather than interdependent, 
highly adversarial areas with conflictual objectives. 
How account-giving and -holding is performed is shaped by specific competencies 
that allow organisations to present themselves in a positive light. Carpenter (2010) 
suggests that reputation is built around a number of competencies. These include 
issues of technical competence, i.e. a reputation for subject expertise, issues of moral 
competence in making decisions that are not perceived as objectionable in the light 
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of wider societal norms and conventions, procedural competence in terms of 
following the ‘right’ rules, and ‘performative’ competence in terms of achieving 
supposedly popular policy outputs and/or outcomes. The presentational focus is 
therefore on those aspects that support the appearance of success.  
This allows us to formulate reputation-related predictions as to observable 
behaviours. We expect an emphasis on procedural appropriateness in the ways of 
doing things when it comes to activities that might be controversial in moral terms - 
and where professional and performative issues might be contested. An emphasis on 
moral aspects features where the overall performance cannot be observed in inputs, 
outputs or outcomes. Technical elements, i.e. the significance of a high level of 
professionalism, is emphasised when it is possible to point to the high degree of ‘ex 
ante’ training and corps-building that may then be used to discount a lack of 
evidence in terms of outputs or outcomes. Thus, reputation-enhancement seeks to 
minimise controversy by emphasising aspects that are difficult to dispute. For 
example, the growing popularity of checklists and other ‘rationalising’ and 
‘formalising’ (risk-based) strategies among regulators is illustrative of presentational 
attempts to emphasise particular competencies so as to silence criticism and re-
define the ‘parameters of blame and accountability’ (Black 2010; see also, Power 
1999; Hood and Rothstein 2001).  
The second implication is that accountability-related performances are taking place 
in front of different audiences i.e., ‘any individual or collective that observes a 
regulatory organization and can judge it’ (Carpenter 2010, 33). Accordingly, 
relationships with audiences differ, ranging from the political, legal, economic and 
social to the professional. It is the appearance before audiences that matters and that 
provides ‘affirmation’ of an agency’s status. These audiences matter in varying ways 
at different points – challenging the way in which, in turn, regulatory (and other 
arm’s length) agencies (and individuals within them) seek to present themselves, as 
discussed above.  The ‘politics of differentiation’ (Carpenter 2010, 55) therefore 
dictate a level of reputational ambiguity, with agencies presenting different faces to 
different audiences: representing themselves on technical, moral, procedural or 
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performative criteria, or all of them at once at different points in time (Carpenter 
2010, 45-7). Formal provisions are only of limited interest (again in contrast to 
principal-agent based arguments). Such provisions may define routine interactions, 
but they can hardly account for the intensity and direction of accountability-holding 
and –giving, especially at times of intense political heat. 
This process is not necessarily always strategic. Actors can come to internalise 
audience expectations and to this extent, the relationship can come to be constitutive. 
As suggested by Goffman, the actor ‘can be taken in’ by their own act/performance 
(1959, 30; 86), incorporating the standards s/he maintains before others ‘so that his 
conscience requires him to act in a socially proper way’ (p. 86). A reputational 
perspective is compatible with both a logic of appropriateness as well as one of 
consequences (March and Olsen 1989): while some actors may have incorporated 
(moral) standards and become transformed in the process, others will maintain 
standards they do not actually believe in ‘because of a lively belief that an unseen 
audience is present who will punish deviations from these standards’ (Goffman 
1959, 87). The loss of audience support will be a powerful ‘civilizing influence’ even 
in the absence of internalised expectations. 
A third implication is interdependence as a result of ‘networks of audiences’. Both 
the account-holder and the account-giver are embedded in wider networks of 
support. The way in which the accountability relationship will play out between the 
two parties will necessarily be impacted by concerns about their reputation in view 
of their respective networks of audiences. Interdependence also matters in terms of 
being able to develop a reputation. First of all, organisations usually consist of 
diverse individuals with different reputational concerns. For example, a prison’s 
overall reputation may be based on escapes, suicides and riots. Within a prison, 
security guards will seek to establish their reputation on the basis of security, 
psychologists on the basis of ‘rehabilitation’, and finance officers on the basis of 
enhancing ‘value for money’. Furthermore, the reputational evaluation of a 
performance of any one agency is shaped by, if not dependent on, the perceived 
performances of others. For example, an economic regulatory agency for water is 
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likely to be dependent on the performance of environmental regulators and of the 
water industry itself. Similarly, the presence of a crisis in financial markets may be 
seen both as a problem of the national regulatory regime for financial markets 
(usually consisting of financial regulatory agencies and central banks) as well as a 
consequence of regulatory approaches in other jurisdictions.  
The overall implication of an emphasis on reputation, audiences, and 
interdependence is that the immediate social interaction between account-holder 
and account-giver is only one aspect in the overall reputation management of any 
one party. To represent oneself - individually and organisationally - is not about 
‘giving account’ or ‘holding to account’. For those giving account, it is about 
conveying the impression of running a competent organisation to much wider 
networks of audiences that might be only loosely connected to the formal political-
institutional accountability mechanisms that principal-agent is so fond of. For those 
holding to account, their interest is in appearing to be holding to account by 
showing that ‘something is being done’, even if at times they lack much interest in 
the actual performance of the entity that is being held to account. For instance, post-
crisis accountability often has a symbolic and cathartic function (Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern, 
and Sundelius 2005), it is about identifying culprits, blame games and framing 
contests rather than an opportunity for reflection and learning. The repeated, but 
usually limited moments of account-holding and -giving are, for both parties, about 
signalling one’s status and appearing reputable.  
After all, individuals and organisations seek to find out about each other, and they 
seek to avoid embarrassment and humiliation. The political and social arena of 
account-holding and –giving represents a situation where gaffes or ‘shots in the 
foot’, whether intentional or unintentional, are unlikely to be met by an 
understanding environment. Whereas, up to a point, accidental misfortunes will be 
forgiven in the contexts of theatre performances or day-to-day social encounters, in 
adversarial contexts, the definition of the situation (that defines what kind of 
professional status is being sought to be maintained) is to exploit such apparent 
weaknesses (some differences may exist in the case of politically more consensual 
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systems). Furthermore, given interdependence, a ‘shot in the foot’ may not even be 
the result of one’s own activities, but they may be the result of being caught in the 
foul-ups of others.  
If bureaucratic and political lives are about the management of appearances and the 
pursuit of esteem, then this allows us to predict where more or less intense interest 
in giving account and holding to account can be observed. Reputational concerns 
appear as a central ‘independent variable’ that might be moderated by other 
mediating factors. Thus, in common with principal-agent based approaches, a 
reputation-based approach offers its own distinct predictive claims. The next section 
explores such claims in more detail.  
 
Reputation-sensitive actors, forums and principals: re-framing expectations of 
accountability behaviour 
Having explored the broad contours of a reputation-based account, we now look at 
the way in which such an account informs expectations regarding account-giving 
actors, and account-holding forums and forum-principals and their implications for 
our initial puzzles. We discuss each accountability party in turn.  
Actors 
As noted, principal-agent based arguments suggest that agency power is based on 
information asymmetry. Exploiting this asymmetry, by cultivating it, by concealing 
or manipulating information or by overwhelming account-holders with information, 
is seen as the source of agency power. In contrast, a reputation-based approach 
argues that it is appearance and presentation that matters, and in particular, it 
matters how these are received by networks of audiences. In other words, 
reputation, the result of the receptiveness by an audience to one’s appearance, is the 
source of organisational power (Maor 2015). It logically follows then that exploiting 
informational asymmetries and avoiding accountability requirements would not 
necessarily be the default strategy from this perspective. Instead, the organisational 
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focus would be on adopting strategies that serve to enhance one’s reputation, which 
may well involve ‘giving account’.  
Being (seen to be) accountable might be said to carry considerable reputational 
benefits for organisations as accountability has become a prevailing norm of good 
governance in public discourse, ‘an icon’, a ‘golden concept’ ‘that can be used to 
patch up a rambling argument, to evoke an image of trustworthiness, fidelity and 
justice, or to hold critics at bay’ (Bovens 2007, 449). Given the normative discourses 
linked to the virtues of accountability, being (or appearing) accountable has 
therefore become an important strategy in the organisational repertoire for 
reputation management. In contrast, being perceived as unaccountable comes with 
reputational costs.   
Moreover, accountability serves to keep an organisation in audiences’ line of vision, 
as well as to offer a means to build (alternative) constituencies of support. The 
accountability process, through its emphasis on dialogue (Mulgan 2003; Bovens 
2007), also offers actors the opportunity to communicate with their audiences, to 
track shifts in their expectations, and to shape and construct audiences' expectations. 
Particular predictions can therefore be made in terms of levels of intensity, and in 
terms of focus of account-giving. 
Intensity of account-giving  
From a reputational perspective, it is not unusual for actors to endorse account-
giving opportunities where they see them as helpful in advancing their reputation 
and managing ‘reputational risk’. We expect more pro-active account-giving, 
whether in terms of attention, responsiveness, rebuttal and prebuttal, in areas of 
higher reputational investment for organisational actors i.e., where it ‘matters’ whether 
one’s reputation is being maintained/enhanced or not.  Such reputational investment links 
to specific core competencies associated with particular organisations—such as those 
technical, moral, procedural and performative competencies (Carpenter 2010) noted 
above— and/or the presence of other heightened reputational threats, such as due to 
recurring criticism and increased salience.  
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Behavioural patterns of actors that are consistent with these expectations have been 
reported in numerous empirical studies. Maor, Gilad, and Ben-Nun Bloom (2013) 
and Gilad, Maor, and Ben-Nun Bloom (2013) for instance, have found differential 
levels of responsiveness among actors when it comes to reacting to external 
criticism: agencies are more likely to respond to criticism in core functional areas 
where they are seen to have a weak or evolving reputation. They are less likely to do 
so when the ‘bad press’ concerns core aspects in which they have a strong reputation 
(‘ad hoc criticism’). They will nevertheless have a higher propensity to react when 
the challenge is intense and/or persistent (Maor, Gilad, and Ben-Nun Bloom 2013). 
Similarly, Koop (2014) finds that politically salient agencies are more likely to initiate 
additional voluntary accountability procedures that go beyond statutory procedures.  
Defensive account-giving behaviour is also an important reputation-fostering 
strategy for actors facing recurrent ‘moral’ criticism regarding their lack of a 
democratic mandate to take potentially far-reaching decisions. For example, central 
banks, regulatory agencies and other appointment-based institutions have regularly 
come under attack as they are said to be suffering from ‘accountability deficits’. If 
alternatives, such as highlighting the value of ‘expertise’ over ‘representativeness’ 
are not successful, or if other reputational factors cannot be marshalled, such as 
those highlighting ‘good’ performance, procedural appropriateness or technical 
brilliance, then engaging in ‘voluntary accountability’-type activities may appear 
desirable. Seeking accountability by, for instance, initiating and binding oneself to 
new mechanisms of giving account, or ‘jump-starting’ or activating existing 
procedures, is an important strategy for such actors to manage reputational risks 
and demonstrate that account-giving is being taken seriously. 
Accountability–seeking behaviour beyond and above formal requirements has been 
widely documented among agencies at both national and supranational levels. A 
variety of agencies have been found to volunteer additional information, to actively 
solicit accountability from their account-holders, and to even initiate new 
accountability arrangements beyond formal obligations. In the EU context, such a 
pro-active approach has been adopted by the European Central Bank (ECB), for 
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instance. The ECB initiated new arrangements of parliamentary accountability in the 
form of regular hearings of its president before the European Parliament’s Economic 
and Monetary Affairs Committee (Jabko 2003, 719-721). This was voluntarily 
adopted by the ECB despite the absence of a formal obligation to do so. Similarly, 
European agencies have instigated new practices of accountability. For example, 
hearings of agency heads in the early days of the EU agencification process emerged 
in the absence of any formal obligations (Busuioc 2013). Agencies have also 
reportedly lobbied the parliament for a more intensive use of existing procedures, 
namely parliamentary visits and hearings (ibid).  
Patterns of instituting new accountability ties and engaging in accountability 
seeking-behaviour are also reported in various national contexts.  In the case of 
Dutch agencies, Schillemans (2007) documents agency initiatives to set up new 
‘horizontal’ forms of accountability. Likewise, Dutch agencies have been found to be 
engaged in voluntary accountability practices (Koop 2014). In the US context, Magill 
(2009) reports extensive practices of voluntary accountability. For instance, the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) is said to have adopted notice and comment 
procedures on its guidance documents in the absence of such requirements in the 
Administrative Procedure Act. Reiss (2011) finds accountability-seeking behaviour 
among three US agencies (FDA, the Environment Protection Agency and the Internal 
Revenue Service, IRS), leading her to observe that ‘the history of these agencies 
shows the persistent phenomenon of agencies seeking to increase their 
accountability’ (Reiss 2011, 647).  
 
For all its potential reputational benefits, accountability is also potentially risky, 
especially as future repercussions are uncertain. As actors volunteer additional 
information or even bind themselves to new accountability ties, such efforts can turn 
out to have negative reputational consequences in the long run. For instance, as a 
result of changes in the political climate, audiences might sour. Therefore, 
organisational actors would ideally aim to reap the reputational benefits of 
accountability, while lowering the associated potential costs of ‘shooting themselves 
in the foot’ in the long run. 
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Voluntary accountability can be beneficial from this perspective as it allows agents 
to sign up to the procedures of their choice. It also comes with the added benefit of 
allowing actors to target and court the support of specific audiences, reaping 
maximum reputational benefits. In other words, it allows actors to draw reputational 
benefits, while controlling, to some extent at least, the audiences to whom and the 
mechanisms through which they are accountable. The latter could entail voluntarily 
choosing to sign up to less stringent procedures than might otherwise be imposed. 
Alternatively, agents could sign up to stringent procedures under terms that are 
favourable to the agency (even if only in terms of timing). In both scenarios, agents 
are in a position to showcase themselves in a positive light. For instance, Koop (2014) 
notes how the overwhelming majority of voluntary procedures introduced by 
agencies were of a less stringent nature compared to statutory obligations. Even 
though some of procedures voluntarily adopted did carry the potential for sanctions 
(e.g. client-satisfaction evaluations), these were reportedly weaker than their 
statutory counterparts. Similarly, the ECB's voluntary agreement to hearings of its 
president before the European Parliament arguably demonstrated a modicum of 
accountability, while avoiding the potential imposition of stricter external 
requirements in a climate of growing criticism of its lack of accountability. Likely 
negative side-effects were reduced through the arguably rather ‘soft’ symbolical 
nature of the procedure which the ECB chose to sign up to: ‘the “dialogue” is not 
very constraining and the ECB sees it as a way to increase its legitimacy and to 
defend its independence‘ (Jabko 2003, 721). Moreover, simultaneously, it was also 
beneficial for the European Parliament’s reputational status as ECB’s exclusive 
account-holder: ‘the European Parliament accepted to play the game in return for its 
privileged oversight role’ (Jabko 2003, 721).  
  
 
Focus and approach 
Accountability-seeking behaviour is likely to be geared towards some audiences 
rather than others as audiences vary in terms of their potential effects (Carpenter 
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and Krause 2012) and as account-giving is shaped by the internal diversity of views 
as to ‘who counts’ in terms of external audiences. In short, some audiences are more 
likely to matter for an actor’s survival than others. Appointment powers, the power 
over the agency’s purse strings, involvement in agency decision-making, sunsetting, 
or other powers that may allow for reversals of actors’ decisions, are in the hands of 
specific audiences. Parliamentary disapproval can (albeit in some political systems 
more than in others) result in budget cuts, making an agency's operational 
functioning difficult. Agencies, therefore, prioritise their accountability-giving 
behaviour towards those key audiences on whose endorsements they are dependent. 
However, an audience’s hold over the actor will not necessarily be linked to formal 
powers and controls. For instance, with its reputation heavily dependent on 
professional endorsement of its expertise, a food safety agency will be highly 
responsive to scientific food safety organisations even in the absence of any formal 
powers vis-à-vis the agency on their part. 
In the age of the ‘audit society’ (Power 1999), focusing on some audiences to the 
detriment of others, or in fact even evading (some) accountability obligations, is 
arguably not altogether ethically unjustifiable or problematic as it can allow 
organisations to cope with overloads and ‘to move forward and “get things done”’ 
(Messner 2009, 934). This is particularly the case given the burdens of multiple, often 
conflicting accountabilities (Koppell 2005; Romzek and Dubnick 1987). Reputation 
focuses organisational attention and equips organisations with a rationale for 
prioritising among multiple external accountability demands. 
In some cases, accountability roles become ever more confused, however. For 
example, a parliamentary ombudsman is not just a regulator of individual 
parliamentary behaviours, but s/he is also a creature of parliament at large. In terms 
of reputation, such a body faces considerable difficulties – being seen as 
‘accommodating’ will raise criticism by politics-sceptical publics, being adversarial 
will not find much enthusiasm among parliamentarians and, thus, risks alienating a 
key audience. 
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At the same time, the need to be responsive to particular external audiences will also 
be moderated by internal processes. Organisations, and the staff within them, have 
dominant self-perceptions about their appropriate role. It is unlikely that 
organisations will seek to display account-giving behaviour in ways that do not 
conform to the internal self-perception of the organisation. This dynamic is central to 
the world of the reputational basis of accountability: internal dissent is likely to lead 
to leakages (i.e. conflict moving ‘front stage’) and therefore the avoidance of 
humiliation and embarrassment will lead to (attempts at imposing) tight controls on 
internal discipline (Goffman 1959, 207-212). As a result, the need to account 
externally for one’s performance is turned into an instrument of punitive and risk-
averse control within organisations. 
Forums  
Most of the literature on accountability assumes that account-holders monotonically 
exercise their accountability roles, and accountability questions are focused on the 
behaviour of the account-giver/actor. Unlike the ‘principal’ of the principal–agent 
model, forums, as noted, are not necessarily ‘invested’ in the delegation process: 
they do not stand to gain or lose out should ‘bureaucratic drift’ occur in the 
delegation process. They are monitors who have not delegated anything of their 
own (Bovens 2007). Forums cannot therefore, be assumed, as is largely the case in 
accountability literature, to have an interest in ex post monitoring unless incentives 
are in place in that direction. Empirical studies confirm that actual forum behaviour 
departs from theoretical expectations that fail to recognise the different nature of 
forums.   
 
Intensity of account-holding 
While forums might not be principals, as organisations with limited resources to pay 
attention (Jones and Baumgartner 2005), their behaviour is shaped by reputational 
calculations; account-holders too need to maintain their appearance and reputation. 
Hence, whether accountability forums ‘care’ about accountability, maintain an 
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interest in discharging their duties, and to what extent, will be linked to their 
reputational concerns. Organisations more broadly, are found to  ‘prioritize the 
execution of those tasks or the underpinning of those traits that are core to their 
identity and reputation (…)’ and in doing so they ‘will seek to enhance and protect 
their core identity- reputation’ (Gilad 2012, 161; 160).   
As with actors, for forums we expect more intensive account-holding in areas of 
higher reputational investment, when accountability is a core task for account-holders 
and/or, as we see later below, when it is associated with other heightened reputational 
threats. Reputational costs (and gains) are heightened for organisations when core 
tasks, as opposed to incidental or secondary tasks, are at stake. Accordingly, so-
called ‘institutions of accountability’ (Mulgan 2000), forums whose primary function 
is to call public officials to account (e.g. ombudsmen, administrative tribunals, 
auditors), are more likely to be vested in account-holding than those forums which 
have a ‘partial or incidental accountability role‘ (e.g. legislators, the media). In other 
words, we expect to see a prioritisation of accountability roles by forums when these 
are central to organisational reputation-building efforts. 
 
These insights help to make sense of ‘divergent’ forum behaviour that is recurrently 
documented in practice. For example, so-called ‘forum drift’ is reported (Schillemans 
and Busuioc 2015): accountability forums systematically fail to read the information 
provided, to ask questions, and/or to sanction agency misbehaviour despite formal 
duties in this regard. Political forums, for which accountability is often one of several 
functions, are notorious in this regard. In their study of UK agencies, Hogwood, 
Judge and McVicar (2000) report low levels of interest among political forums 
(ministers and Parliament) in holding agencies to account, except for a minority of 
politically-sensitive agencies. Other authors speak of directorates that ‘can operate in 
an enclosed world with [their] own procedures and values’ (Dudley 1994, 233) or 
agencies that ‘languish in obscurity’ (Pollitt 2006, 29), with most agencies operating 
at the periphery of political attention (Schillemans 2011).  
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A lack of interest in demanding and enacting accountability has been documented 
among other types of forums as well. These include management board 
representatives of European agencies (Busuioc 2013) or ministry superiors of 
national representatives in EU committees (Brandsma 2013). What all these forums 
have in common is that accountability-holding is a non-core, or incidental, task. 
Members of a forum who are employed in ministries and agencies at the national 
level, and meet only sporadically at the supranational level, will not stand to gain or 
lose reputation-wise from failing to diligently discharge their peripheral oversight 
duties at a different level of governance. Similarly legislative forums will not 
necessarily stand to lose reputationally from failing to enact oversight functions 
towards obscure, low salience agencies.   
 
Nevertheless, even secondary tasks carry a potential for reputational risk when they 
catch public and/or media attention. Thus, forums—including partial ones— much 
like their account-givers, will and do pay attention to issues (other than core tasks) 
that carry the potential of increased reputational risk due to increased salience or 
heightened controversy. Empirically, political salience is repeatedly found to be 
positively related with higher levels of interest (and, in other accounts, control) over 
agency behaviour (Calvert McCubbins, and Weingast 1989, 590; Dudley 1994; 
Hogwood, Judge and McVicar 2000; Mulgan 2003; Pollitt et al. 2004; Pollitt 2006; 
Egeberg and Trondal 2009; Verhoest et al. 2010). Hogwood, Judge and McVicar 
(2000, 221) report high moments of salience for a minority of agencies, noting a focus 
on ‘politically hot issues and constituency cases.’ In his study of minister-agency 
relations, Pollitt (2006, 41) contends that: ‘on the whole, political actors do not take 
much interest in agencies unless and until disasters, scandals, or breakdowns come 
along’; ‘the moral of the story is that, when embarrassments, scandals, or disasters 
occur, politicians and the media suddenly take an enormously detailed interest in 
organizational activities they have never asked about before’ (Pollitt 2006, 39). 
Similarly, Dudley (1994, 234) recounts how the UK transport minister’s attention 
was determined primarily ‘by the level of political salience rather than official 
organisational arrangements.’ While ’she chose not to take control in areas of low 
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political salience’, ’in a case of high national political salience (…) she considered 
that the prestige of the government was at stake, and was not prepared to remain on 
the sidelines’ (Dudley 1994, 233). 
 
For ‘institutions of accountability’, in contrast, accountability is a core task. Their 
organisational reputation is exclusively built on their competence in discharging 
their (distinct) accountability roles. The manner in which they discharge their 
accountability responsibilities is thus crucial to their reputation-building efforts. 
Moreover, if found slacking, the reputational costs would be very high. We, 
therefore, expect ‘institutions of accountability’ to be diligent accountability forums, 
intensively demanding and enacting accountability in their specific spheres of 
interest. For instance, a study of EU agency accountability has found how, full-time 
account holders such as the European Ombudsman, the Court of Justice or the Court 
of Auditors were diligent account-holders, pushing their accountability mandates 
above and beyond formal requirements. This contrasts with partial account-holders 
such as management board representatives or European Parliament committees, 
among which forum neglect of accountability processes was reported (Busuioc 
2013).  
Focus and approach 
The focus and approach of account-holders is guided by reputational concerns 
rather than simply by concerns as to how to ensure optimal levels of control. As 
discussed, organisations act in pursuit of a unique reputation and seek to occupy 
niche monopolies. We, therefore, expect ‘institutions of accountability’ to define a 
‘niche’ role for themselves, which allows them to differentiate themselves from other 
account-holders. Such ‘niche building’ can be observed in a range of areas. For 
example, Barberis (2008) notes a ‘functional differentiation of accountability’. Bovens 
(2007) highlights how different forums require different types of information and 
evaluation criteria, while Black (2009) points to different legitimacy claims 
underpinning different accountability mechanisms. For instance, the European 
Ombudsman, which acted as an accountability forum towards EU institutions, 
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bodies and agencies, built a strong profile on issues of access to documents. While its 
case load is varied, this has been part of a conscious institutional effort - reflecting its 
ability to partially set its own agenda - to proactively single out this area as a key 
element of its work.  
The need to cultivate a unique reputation also drives forums towards defining their 
focus and approach so as to steer clear of the domains of other account-holders with 
potentially overlapping mandates. The Financial Ombudsman in the UK is said to 
have adopted an approach that emphasises informality in the interaction with 
complainants as well as individual dispute resolution to differentiate itself from the 
civil courts and the financial regulator, respectively (the then Financial Services 
Authority) (Gilad and Yogev 2012). The European Ombudsman differentiated itself 
from the EU’s Court of Justice by describing its role as ‘life beyond legality’ (as 
opposed to ‘legality’), and as a ‘magistrate of influence’ (as opposed to the Court’s 
adversarial approach). It stressed its unique ability to (partially) set its own mandate, 
to look into aspects of organisational culture and other systemic issues, to exercise 
political pressure and offer different types of redress (Magnette 2003). Similarly, the 
Internal Audit Service of the European Commission engaged in co-ordination and 
an informal role division with the European Court of Auditors to avoid overlaps in 
their respective roles as financial accountability forums (Busuioc 2013). 
A forum’s chosen approach towards accountability is further motivated by the need 
to minimise potential reputational damage. Given that being seen as ‘demanding 
accountability’ is what matters, we expect a prioritisation regarding salient and 
visible instances of misbehaviour. Etienne (2015), for example, describes how 
inspectors tasked with incident detection effectively narrowed their inspection 
mandate by focusing on incidents noticeable to the outside world as opposed to 
those that occurred on the perimeter of the facility. Thus, inspectors’ monitoring and 
policing were not guided by an interest in incident detection or risk prevention, but 
by an interest in maintaining an appearance of ‘being in control’ in order to 
minimise their own reputational risk of being associated with visible instances of 
non-detection. Similarly, Dudley (1994, 224) found how the UK Transport minister 
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exercised little, if any, control vis-à-vis a low salience body ‘towards which he or she 
should have executive power, and at the same time became intimately involved in 
an organization where the arm’s length principle should prevail’, given the latter’s 
political salience. 
Forum-Principals 
We now turn to those forum-principals, i.e. account-holders, which have delegated 
powers/tasks to the agent and are involved in monitoring post-delegation. This is 
the situation that closest matches the assumptions modelled in the principal-agent 
literature. Again, even when assuming this particular constellation, taking 
reputation as a central motivating theme challenges a number of key orthodoxies. 
First of all, a principal-agent largely assumes that the principal rules supreme in the 
contractual relationship, albeit a level of ‘agency loss’ inevitably occurs. Seen from a 
reputational approach, however, principals rarely, if ever, reign supreme. Like any 
organisation, principals will be in a dependent relationship with their audiences. 
They too, cannot afford to be perceived as being illegitimate and require (a degree 
of) support from their audiences to be able to undertake desired action. For instance, 
ministerial interventions in the activities of an independent regulator and/or 
attempts to disband an under-performing regulator can backfire if such actions are 
regarded as unhelpful meddling by the industry, financial markets, the larger public, 
or other members of a government. 
Due to interdependence, the roles of account-holder and -giver are not necessarily 
one-directional either. As both parties relate to wider (and overlapping) networks of 
audiences, the views and expectations of these audiences also matter, thus 
potentially placing the account-giver in a far more influential position than the 
account-holder. An adversarial interrogation style may be seen as ‘reputation-
harming’, especially where ‘expertise’ is held in higher regard than ‘democracy’. For 
example, financial markets, newspapers, and other audiences may have only limited 
time for forum-principal’s grandstanding when the account-giver is seen as more 
competent and legitimate. Moreover, as observed earlier, under conditions of 
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interdependence, the reputation of the principal can depend on the performance of 
the actor, restricting its space for action and acting as a check on its ability to ‘reign 
supreme’. Punishing an agent can be reputationally costly for the principal: poor 
agent performance can reflect badly on the principal. Brandsma (2013) for instance, 
reports principals’ lack of willingness to use formal sanctions in practice; a 
misbehaving agent is simultaneously an indication that the principal is ‘really doing 
something wrong as a manager.’ 
In short, a reputation-based account suggests that the talk of principal and agents 
(and the implicit hierarchy in that relationship) cannot be fully sustained under the 
conditions of audience networks and interdependence. While such account-holders 
might be more ‘invested’ in oversight by virtue of their investment in the delegation 
process, their account-holding behaviour will nevertheless still be considerably 
shaped by reputational concerns. 
Moreover, the broader climate of acceptability is relevant for both third-party 
forums and forum-principals and constrains the actions they can undertake in 
exercising their oversight functions. As audiences’ preferences undergo significant 
shifts, the principal’s style of holding to account is likely to alter to reflect such 
changes in audience preferences. For example, it is unlikely that a ‘harsh’ 
enforcement style towards the financial sector would have gone down nicely with 
audiences before the financial crisis, as this would have contradicted the dominant 
worldview of their key constituencies that favoured a ‘finance-friendly’ approach. 
However, that emphasis on ‘light-touch regulation’ quickly gave way to demands 
for tough enforcement action after the crisis (to which, for example, the UK financial 
regulator responded). Similarly, in tax enforcement, the way in which the UK tax 
authority (HM Revenue and Customs) went about its business in settling with large 
corporations early rather than pursuing them through the courts for much higher 
damages, may have appeared legitimate to its audiences at one point. But once 
broader political opinion turned on multinational tax-gaming corporations, it was 
impossible for such account-holders not to be responsive to such public views. The 
fact that such contrasting perspectives on what actions were seen as justifiable were 
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not recognised as inconsistent account-holding reflects the secondary role that 
(consistent) account-holding actually plays when it comes to moments of exchange. 
Conclusion 
A reputational perspective highlights the various ways in which different 
participants respond to demands for holding to, or giving, account. This approach 
helps illuminate, and is given considerable support by, a substantial amount of 
empirical literature. A reputation-based account suggests that individuals and 
organisations will concentrate on some aspects of their overall existence and attempt 
to build a unique reputation for competence, while trying to minimise reputational 
damage. For actors, this involves (defensive or pre-emptive) accountability-seeking 
in areas of high reputational investment (for instance, involving core competencies), 
choosing the forums and methods through which account is given (so as to 
maximise reputational benefits of accountability and minimise its costs), and 
choosing whether some voluntary information will advance the presentation of self. 
For forums (including principal-forums), reputational concerns will guide their 
attention and prioritisation of mandated accountability duties as well as chosen 
focus and approach in a manner that the dominant principal-agent framework, and 
related accountability approaches informed by it, have been unable to capture. 
A reputation-based account therefore resolves the two puzzles noted at the outset. In 
an effort to manage and cultivate their bureaucratic reputation, actors may well 
choose to be accountable, even in the absence of any formal obligation to do so, and 
forums might not actually enact their role to hold to account even though they are 
formally mandated to do so. And despite negative and perverse effects, they will 
continue to re-enact the performance, given its reputational benefits. 
 
More generally, while sharing the possibility to make predictive claims, a 
reputation-based perspective offers an alternative framework to principal-agent 
based approaches to accountability. The latter is based on hierarchical relationships, 
assumptions of information asymmetry and goal-conflict problems. It assumes that 
formal mechanisms address the tension between democratically mandated 
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‘responsiveness’ (of agents to principals) and safeguarding ‘expertise’ (of agents 
insulated from election-seeking politicians). None of these basic assumptions exist in 
a reputation-based account in which power is granted or withheld by audiences that 
may well possess no formal powers; principals are often in a co-dependent, rather 
than hierarchical, relationship with their agents; and the source of bureaucratic 
power is reputational and a matter of audience perception rather than stemming 
from informational asymmetries.  
An argument that focuses on reputation and that suggests that accountability is not 
at the heart of ‘account-giving’ and ‘account-holding’ does not exclude the 
possibility that ‘more’ accountability is possible as a result of the adoption of new, 
denser accountabilities ties. An increase in overall levels of accountability can 
emerge as a side-product of account-givers and account-holders’ seeking to please 
particular audiences, thereby consenting to paying more attention to ‘giving’ or 
‘holding’ account. Once such steps have been taken, even if they are of a voluntary 
nature, it is difficult for such decisions to be reversed. Therefore, any decision to 
‘give more’ or to ‘hold more’ to account will have long-term repercussions, 
especially when extensive account-giving behaviours are directed at well-mobilised 
constituencies that themselves might be eager to demonstrate their competence as 
account-holders. 
Where, then, does this leave those observers who are interested in ‘institutional 
design’? Formal structures can be seen as primarily having a stage-setting type 
function, creating the venues in which ‘accountability holding’ and ‘giving’ take 
place. They set the scene for those participants who need to present themselves to 
their audiences at particular times. In order to explain and predict actual 
accountability behaviour (also in terms of intensity, focus and approach), we need to 
pay closer attention to the reputational gains at stake, rather than focusing 
exclusively on formal obligations. This entails reflecting on who the relevant 
audiences are and whether ‘accountability’ brings reputational gains to the 
respective actor and/or forum vis-à-vis their relevant audience(s). In terms of 
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design, an implication of this could be to attach concrete reputational incentives to 
accountability structures.  
 
Organisations and individuals are in a continuous struggle for recognition and 
support. Support denial is distressing and humiliating. Account-holding and -giving 
may be a focusing event in the life of organisations, but these moments are, 
ultimately, about enhancing organisational reputation rather than opening oneself 
up to scrutiny and deliberation for the sake of normative ideas about democracy. 
Therefore, if ‘accountability’ is to continue to be seen as central to a ‘good 
governance’ agenda, then a more careful consideration of the implicit reputational 
incentives at stake for different participants will be essential.  
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